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Abstract On 18 September 2013, a team of Greenpeace activists attempted to 
board the Prirazlomnaya oil platform, situated within the Russian exclusive eco-
nomic zone, intending to disrupt drilling activities and raise awareness of Arctic 
environmental issues. This action resulted in the subsequent arrest of 30 individu-
als associated with the protest, as well as that of the Arctic Sunrise, a Greenpeace 
support vessel sailing under the Dutch flag. The plight of the so-called ‘Arctic 30’ 
dominated global headlines until their release under a general amnesty by Russia 
in December 2013. Meanwhile, the arrest of the vessel prompted the commence-
ment of arbitral proceedings by the Netherlands against Russia, a process that 
had yet to be concluded at the time of writing. In November 2013, however, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea upheld a Dutch petition for provi-
sional measures, including the release of the vessel and its crew subject to the pay-
ment of a bond. In so doing, the Tribunal faced the issue of non-participation by 
a respondent state for the first time, while also developing arguably a ‘back-door’ 
position on prompt release. In the meantime, aspects of the legality of environ-
mental activism at sea remain somewhat uncertain which, given that a consider-
able number of protest vessels are registered to the Netherlands, may engage the 
litigative attention of the Dutch authorities in future incidents.
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14.1  Introduction
In recent years, the legal position of protest actions at sea has become a matter 
of increasing significance. Marine protests have proved to be a particularly 
attractive tactic for many campaign groups, since the dramatic media coverage 
that invariably accompanies such activities commands considerable public atten-
tion, often helping to generate additional support for the cause in question. 
Protest activism at sea is by no means a recent phenomenon1; the localised 
blockading of ports has long been an effective weapon for disgruntled coastal 
interests, although nautical campaigning has steadily expanded to become more 
pelagic in scope since the late 1960s. Many modern exponents now spend 
extended periods at sea in pursuit of their targets, traversing a variety of zones of 
maritime jurisdiction in the process and engaging in activities that operate at the 
limits of—and sometimes beyond—the current legal parameters of entitlements 
to free speech and assembly.
Maritime protest also varies significantly in format and conduct. This may 
entail essentially passive activism, in which campaigners merely observe and 
 document the activities in question and express their dissent in a non-obstructive 
manner,2 a practice dubbed ‘bearing witness’ by Greenpeace.3 Alternatively, 
many campaign groups have considered that such tactics are unlikely to provoke 
1
 On earlier questions raised by the legality of such approaches see Plant 1983, at 146–162 
(examining activities dating back to 1971). See also Plant 2002.
2
 The ‘mere shadowing’ of a vessel appears to be a universally accepted application of the prin-
ciple of freedom of navigation: Plant 1983, at 153.
3
 See further Teulings 2011, at 223–225. As General Counsel for Greenpeace, Teulings is keen 
to draw a clear distinction between this approach and the tactics of more militant activists. In 
the interests of proper balance, however, it should be observed that in the context of Arctic oil 
platforms Greenpeace has engaged in more disruptive manifestations of direct action protest that 
clearly extend beyond mere observation and placarding.
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the desired changes in policy and behaviour. Accordingly, more interventionist 
forms of direct action have been deployed to physically impede the activity in 
question, which has increasingly led to violent clashes at sea. This approach has 
been perhaps most vividly illustrated by the regular campaigns waged by the Sea 
Shepherd Conservation Society against the Japanese Antarctic whaling fleet, a 
decade-long saga that has degenerated from a series of entertaining Corinthian 
escapades into a significant nautical hazard, culminating in dangerous collisions 
between vessels in remote Polar waters, the sinking of a yacht and, ultimately, 
the spectre of piracy proceedings in at least one jurisdiction.4 As is the case with 
land-based protests,5 the legal response to activism at sea involves a fine balanc-
ing act between the competing imperatives of protected and socially-valuable 
rights to protest and the need to ensure wider issues of public safety. Marine 
campaigning also carries an inherent risk of civil and criminal penalties, as well 
as the possibility of serious physical injury6—a prospect for which states seem-
ingly carry at least a moral obligation to ensure that their nationals exhibit an 
appreciation.7
The legal position concerning activism at sea has a particular resonance for the 
Netherlands, since a number of campaign groups have found an accommodating 
home for many of their key protest vessels within the Dutch shipping registry. This 
has created occasional diplomatic and legal difficulties for the national authorities. As 
the flag state of vessels operated by Sea Shepherd, the Dutch authorities, together 
with Australia, New Zealand and the US, have been moved to issue regular quadri-
partite statements upholding broad support for freedom of speech at sea, yet con-
demning certain actions of its nationally-registered vessels and urging respect for 
4
 Institute of Cetacean Research and Others v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and 
Watson, 9th Cir., 725 F.3d 940, 2013, overturning an earlier decision of the US District Court in 
Institute of Cetacean Research  et al. v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society et al,  W. D. Wash, 
860 F. Supp 2d 1216, 2012 that had been distinctly more favourable to the activists. On the 
legal issues raised by these campaigns, see Mossop 2012; Doby 2013. Notwithstanding the 
US position, a successful piracy action is considered unlikely to be forthcoming against Sea 
Shepherd under the current Japanese provisions, even though new legislation was adopted in 
2009 which, in principle, considered such harassment to potentially lie within the scope of the 
law. Kanehara 2011, at 206.
5
 On the challenges inherent in balancing competing considerations raised by protest activism 
see Mead 2010, at 57–117.
6
 A vivid example being the distinctly ill-advised attempt by the pro-Palestinian activist crew of 
the Mavi Marmara in 2010 to navigate through an Israeli blockade, duly sustaining six fatalities 
and a host of serious injuries.
7
 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 
2010 flotilla incident, September 2011, para 159, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_
east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf. Accessed 9 January 2015.
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navigational safety.8 Such concerns have also led to calls for the Netherlands to 
review the grant of flag privileges and to reinforce procedures to facilitate the expul-
sion of delinquent vessels, although wholesale amendments to national laws on ves-
sel registration have thus far been resisted.9 The Netherlands also remains the flag 
state of a considerable number of vessels operated by Greenpeace, notably the Arctic 
Sunrise. The arrest of this veteran protest ship in September 2013, following the 
attempted boarding of the controversial Prirazlomnaya oil platform by activists in the 
Russian exclusive economic zone (EEZ), subsequently prompted arbitration proceed-
ings between the Netherlands and the Russian Federation. These proceedings remain 
in progress and are likely to formally conclude in 2015. In November 2013, however, 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) considered a request by the 
Netherlands for the grant of provisional measures to release the vessel and its crew. 
This action, the twenty-second case submitted to the Tribunal thus far, resulted in an 
order delivered in favour of the petition by the Netherlands. Moreover, the position 
taken by ITLOS may have intriguing implications for future detention actions heard 
by this forum, in addressing the issue of non-engagement by the respondent state and, 
arguably, pioneering a basis for the prompt release of vessels that may exceed the 
intentions prescribed by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.10 This 
chapter, accordingly, examines the issues raised in the dispute and the reasoning of 
the Tribunal in granting the release of the Arctic Sunrise, before addressing a wider 
series of emerging questions pertaining to the legality of oil platform protests.
14.2  The Arctic Sunrise Dispute
The Arctic Sunrise incident is illustrative of long-standing environmental concerns 
over the prospective expansion of industrial activities within the Arctic region. In 
recent years, the Arctic has been transformed from a comparative legal and political 
backwater into an arena of global strategic interest. The projected reduction of 
8
 See, most recently, Joint statement on whaling and safety at sea, 20 December 2013, http:// 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bz/documenten-en-publicaties/vergaderstukken/2013/12/20/
joint-statement-on-whaling-and-safety-at-sea-2013.html. Accessed 9 January 2015. No such 
statement was issued in 2014, largely due to the limited whaling activities undertaken by Japan 
that year following the ruling by the International Court of Justice in March 2014 that these 
activities had failed to qualify as ‘scientific research’: Case Concerning Whaling in the Antarctic 
(Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), ICJ, Judgment of 31 March 2014. Prior to the ICJ 
judgment, however, there were a series of conflicts at sea between protest vessels and Japanese 
whaling ships. On 19 December 2014, Sea Shepherd was ruled to have been in contempt of an 
injunction issued in 2013 by the US courts, restraining the organisation from navigating within 
500 metres of the Japanese fleet. Institute of Cetacean Research and Others v. Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society and Paul Watson, On a Motion for Contempt, 9th Cir., No. 12-35266, 2014.
9
 This has led to some friction with Japan, which in September 2014 criticised the response of 
the Netherlands as the flag state of at least one Sea Shepherd vessel to be insufficient. Chair’s 
Report of the 65th Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, 2014, para 272.
10
 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1883 UNTS 396 (hereinafter LOSC).
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Polar ice coverage has raised the tantalising economic prospect of a dramatic 
increase in industrial and shipping possibilities in these waters, prompting consider-
able interest in securing access to the natural resources of the region on the part of 
both Arctic and non-Arctic States.11 Nevertheless, strong concerns have been 
voiced as to the potential environmental ramifications of the wholesale economic 
development of the Arctic, with calls to preserve the region as an unsullied wilder-
ness area of global significance.12 Particular reservations have been expressed over 
the poorly regulated pursuit of hydrocarbons in these waters, with the damage 
wrought by the Exxon Valdez tanker disaster in Alaska in 1989 serving as a stark 
reminder of the dangers posed by oil to the highly sensitive marine environment of 
the Arctic. Indeed, the apocalyptic ecological prospect of a Deepwater Horizon-
style calamity in this region has prompted the European Parliament to adopt a 
Resolution calling for ‘a ban on oil drilling in the icy Arctic waters of the EU and 
the EEA’.13
In 2010 Greenpeace launched its ‘Save the Arctic’ campaign, a suite of activi-
ties that has included information gathering, environmental education and out-
reach, advocacy at pertinent regional and international fora and a series of direct 
action campaigns against offshore oil and gas installations in a variety of jurisdic-
tions. Particular ire has been reserved for the Prirazlomnaya oil platform, operated 
by the Russian energy giant Gazprom and situated in the Pechora Sea in northern 
Arctic waters. Strong concerns have been expressed, both by NGOs and the 
European Parliament, over the relatively lax approach to the regulation of Arctic 
11
 A number of claims to extended continental shelves in the Arctic have been submitted 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, most recently as announced by the 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 December 2014 in respect of Greenland. Denmark 
and Greenland will today file a submission regarding the continental shelf north of Greenland, 
15 December 2015, http://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=71574E42-6115-4D16-
9C8A-4C056F8603F3. Accessed 9 January 2015. Meanwhile, numerous non-Arctic States 
have developed national strategies to frame their strategic objectives and interactions with the 
region, including many jurisdictions far removed from Arctic waters. In November 2014 the IMO 
adopted a mandatory International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, which is expected 
to enter into effect in 2017. Although applicable to both Polar regions, this instrument was pri-
marily developed with increased Arctic navigation in mind.
12
 Bastmeijer 2009.
13
 European Parliament Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic, 2013/2595(RSP), 12 
March 2014, para 33. Oil and gas legislation adopted by the EU prior to the Arctic Sunrise 
 dispute also considered the potential problems raised by Arctic expansion—notwithstanding 
the relatively limited ability of its institutions to secure additional regulatory standards in this 
region—noting, inter alia, that ‘[t]he serious environmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters 
require special attention to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic in relation to any 
offshore oil and gas operation, including exploration, taking into account the risk of major acci-
dents and the need for effective response.’ Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC, 52nd Recital.
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hydrocarbon operations assumed by the Russian authorities.14 In August 2012 the 
Arctic Sunrise was used as a base to launch a first high-profile protest against the 
Prirazlomnaya rig on account of its oil spill response plan having expired, thereby 
rendering Gazprom’s continued operations technically illegal under Russian law. 
Six activists briefly scaled the platform, while another group chained themselves 
to the anchor of its primary support vessel, the Anna Akhmatova, disrupting drill-
ing activities for five days.
On 18 September 2013, Greenpeace activists attempted to board the platform 
again. Four inflatable boats were launched from the Arctic Sunrise which, at the 
material time, was apparently situated at a nearby point within the Russian EEZ, 
yet outside the three-mile exclusion zone established by the national authorities 
around the Prirazlomnaya.15 The activists were swiftly apprehended at the base of 
the platform. Later that day, the Russian authorities directed a diplomatic note to 
their Dutch counterparts announcing their intention to arrest the Arctic Sunrise. 
The vessel was duly boarded in the Russian EEZ on 19 September, an operation 
that involved firing eleven warning shots, and subsequently sailed under arrest to 
Murmansk.
The criminal charges against the arrested activists and the legal basis for their 
detention would oscillate considerably over the course of the following weeks. 
Between 26 September and 3 October 2013 the various members of the ‘Arctic 
30’—as they were swiftly dubbed by the global media—were each individually 
charged with piracy, despite a categorical public assertion by President Vladimir 
Putin that the activists were ‘obviously’ not pirates.16 On 4 October, in response to 
the piracy charges, the Netherlands formally commenced arbitral proceedings pursu-
ant to Annex VII of the LOSC. In the meantime, a combination of official communi-
cations between Russia and the Netherlands, as well as municipal legal proceedings 
against the Arctic Sunrise itself, demonstrated a litany of inconsistencies concerning 
the basis for the arrest and ongoing detention of the vessel. Concurrent with the ini-
tial attempt to board the Prirazlomnaya, the Russian authorities informed the 
Netherlands by a diplomatic note on 18 September that the Arctic Sunrise was to be 
seized due to alleged terrorism offences. On 1 October a further diplomatic note 
14
 Indeed, in arguably the most prominent example of diplomatic concern over the regulatory 
regime adopted by Russia for offshore installations in these waters, the European Parliament 
expressed ‘its strong concern regarding the rush for oil exploration and drilling in the Arctic 
without adequate standards being enforced, such as on the Gazprom Prirazlomnaya plat-
form in the Russian EEZ.’ European Parliament Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic, 
2013/2595(RSP), 12 March 2014, at para 32.
15
 This version of events is based on evidence provided by Greenpeace and incorporated in the 
Dutch submission to ITLOS. There has been no credible suggestion that the Arctic Sunrise at any 
time transgressed into the exclusion zone surrounding the rig—a distinction of significance, as 
discussed below—since Russia declined to submit any contrary evidence to ITLOS, and thus far 
the subsequent arbitral panel, to dispute this assertion.
16
 Putin: Greenpeace Activists Not Pirates but They Violated International Law, RT, 27 
September 2013, http://rt.com/news/putin-greenpeace-pirates-arctic-323/. Accessed 9 January 
2015.
36514 Platforms, Protestors and Provisional Measures …
asserted that the vessel had been visited by Russian law enforcement officials 
 pursuant to powers under Articles 56, 60 and 80 LOSC and Article 36(1)(1) of the 
domestic Federal Law ‘On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian 
Federation’. By 7 October, however, a national court order for the seizure of the 
Arctic Sunrise revealed that this position had subsequently shifted back to a founda-
tion of piracy, while on 18 October an administrative judgment found the master of 
the vessel guilty of ‘erratic navigation’.17 On 23 October the initial piracy charges 
brought against the arrested activists were downgraded to those of ‘hooliganism’ and 
resisting arrest, following widespread political and legal condemnation of the 
 original indictment.18
14.2.1  Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
In accordance with Article 287 LOSC, arbitral proceedings under Annex VII of the 
LOSC were instituted by the Netherlands against Russia, alleging that the board-
ing, arrest and detention of the Arctic Sunrise in the Russian EEZ without the prior 
consent of the flag state contravened Articles 58(1) and 87(1)(a) LOSC, in addition 
to the rights to liberty and security and to leave a state’s territory on the part of the 
vessel’s crew founded under Articles 9 and 12(2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966.19 The Netherlands accordingly sought a declara-
tion from the tribunal that these actions were internationally wrongful acts and that 
Russia should thereby cease and desist such violations, provide appropriate assur-
ances and guarantees of non-repetition and facilitate full reparation for the injury 
caused thereby.
Under Article 290(1) LOSC, provisional measures may be prescribed by a 
court or tribunal if it considers that it prima facie has jurisdiction over the dis-
pute and if such measures are ‘appropriate under the circumstances to preserve 
the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to 
17
 Full details of these bases are cited in Annexes 1, 3 and 6 of the Dutch request for Provisional 
Measures. The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), ITLOS, 
Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures under Article 290, para 5, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 October 2013, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/ 
itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations.pdf. 
Accessed 9 January 2015.
18
 The potential applicability of the offence of piracy to protests conducted against oil platforms 
is considered below in Sect. 14.3.1.
19
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 (hereinafter ICCPR). It 
has been observed that the dual nature of these claims, based as they are on both navigational 
matters and human rights considerations, might present jurisdictional complications for the arbi-
tral tribunal in due course. Oude Elferink 2014, at 279. As noted below, however, the refusal 
by the tribunal of an amicus curiae petition by Greenpeace specifically engaging the human 
rights elements of the protest may suggest that the panel is minded to pay closer attention to the 
 specific law of the sea aspects of the dispute.
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the marine environment, pending the final decision’. In view of the urgency of 
many marine-related disputes and the time-frame necessary to convene an 
Annex VII tribunal, Article 290(5) LOSC permits ITLOS to facilitate considera-
tion of provisional measures in its stead if, absent agreement to the contrary 
between the parties, a period of two weeks has elapsed from the time of the ini-
tial request for interim relief and ‘if it considers that prima facie the tribunal 
which is to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the 
situation so requires.’ Receiving no satisfactory response from the Russian 
authorities, the Netherlands accordingly filed a request for provisional measures 
before ITLOS on 21 October 2013. The following day, Russia stated that it nei-
ther accepted the Annex VII process in this context nor did it intend to partici-
pate at the ITLOS proceedings.20 With the exception of a polite statement 
declining its involvement within the Annex VII arbitration,21 the Russian 
Federation has remained steadfastly aloof to the ongoing judicial machinations 
of the dispute.
Russia’s objection to the arbitration process has been founded on the basis of a 
Declaration made upon ratifying the LOSC on 12 March 1997, in which
[t]he Russian Federation declares that, in accordance with article 298 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does not accept the procedures, provided 
for in section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, entailing binding decisions with respect 
to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 of the 
Convention, relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or 
titles; disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government 
vessels and aircraft, and disputes concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the 
exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction; and disputes in respect of which the Security 
Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of 
the United Nations.
The Russian Federation, bearing in mind articles 309 and 310 of the Convention, 
declares that it objects to any declarations and statements made in the past or which may 
be made in future when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, or made for any 
other reason in connection with the Convention, that are not in keeping with the provi-
sions of article 310 of the Convention. The Russian Federation believes that such declara-
tions and statements, however phrased or named, cannot exclude or modify the legal 
effect of the provisions of the Convention in their application to the party to the 
Convention that made such declarations or statements, and for this reason they shall not 
be taken into account by the Russian Federation in its relations with that party to the 
Convention.22
20
 Note verbale of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Berlin, 22 October 2013, https:// 
www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Note_verbale_Russian_
Federation_eng.pdf. Accessed 9 January 2015.
21
 Note verbale from the Russian Federation to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 27 February 
2014 http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2532. Accessed 9 January 2015.
22
 Declaration of the Russian Federation upon the ratification of the Law of the Sea 
Convention, 12 March 1997, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_
declarations.htm. Accessed 9 January 2015 (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, while apparently prescribing a basis to avoid the compulsory settle-
ment mechanisms of the LOSC, the Declaration may be considered to have been 
founded upon a circular and ultimately flawed position. While Article 298 LOSC 
does allow for the elaboration of optional exceptions on the basis of law enforce-
ment activities, the provision clearly provides that such exemptions apply only to 
the specific disputes addressed under Article 297(2) and (3) LOSC.23 These issues 
are confined to marine scientific research and fisheries matters respectively. In 
contrast, the present dispute engaged—in the clear view of the Applicant, at 
least24—an alleged breach by the coastal state of the freedom of navigation 
enjoyed by foreign vessels within the national EEZ, as prescribed under Article 58 
LOSC. The position concerning this potential cause for international litigation is 
instead addressed under Article 297(1) LOSC. It therefore lies outside the scope of 
national discretion to exclude particular matters from the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the court, as contemplated under Article 298 LOSC. The distinction is signifi-
cant given the explicit reference to Articles 309 and 310 LOSC within the Russian 
Declaration, since these provisions preclude further reservations or statements on 
the part of the ratifying state that are not expressly permitted by the LOSC, or that 
purport to exclude or modify the effect of its terms. Read cumulatively, the practi-
cal effect of the Declaration rather undermines the Russian assertion that disputes 
engaging law enforcement activities concerning the exercise of national rights or 
jurisdiction are excluded from the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Indeed, 
the Declaration essentially serves to emphasise that the ability of a contracting 
party to exclude from the jurisdiction of a tribunal incidents arising from law 
enforcement operations should be strictly limited to the specific contexts of marine 
scientific research and fisheries infractions, while simultaneously reinforcing the 
principle that attempts to undermine this clear position through contrary national 
declarations should be strongly deterred in order to facilitate the consistent inter-
pretation and operation of the Convention.
As Churchill observes, ‘the reasoning in the provisional measures orders of the 
ITLOS is not always entirely adequate or convincing’.25 This is especially true of 
the Tribunal in this context, which confined its rejection of the Russian position to a 
mere sentence,26 an exercise in brevity that may be considered counter-productive. 
This was rectified to a considerable degree on 26 November 2014, when the Annex 
VII Tribunal delivered a unanimous award on jurisdiction that comprehensively 
23
 Article 298(1)(b) LOSC.
24
 Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures under Article 290, para 5, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 October 2013, paras 19–22 and 25, http://www.itlos. 
org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Request_provisional_measures_en_withtranslations. 
pdf. Accessed 9 January 2015.
25
 Churchill 2015, at 22.
26
 The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), ITLOS, 
Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, Order, 22 November 2013, para 45 (herein-
after The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case).
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addressed the Russian Declaration and declared categorically that the effect of this 
statement did not preclude law enforcement activities pursuant to Article 297(1) 
LOSC from the jurisdiction of the dispute resolution mechanisms of the 1982 
Convention.27 Meanwhile, and within the context of the ITLOS decision, the sparse 
exploration of this issue generated a degree of consternation among individual 
members of the Tribunal, with Judges Wolfrum and Kelly of the view that ‘[a] con-
vincing reasoning is missing but is called for’.28 Moreover, Judge Jesus considered 
the concise treatment of this issue to be especially troublesome, since this was ulti-
mately the only legal point that Russia had sought to make in response to the Dutch 
petition.29 These concerns notwithstanding, there was seemingly strong endorse-
ment for the Tribunal’s decision on the practical effect of the Russian Declaration,30 
which accordingly raised practical and legal questions concerning the intended 
non-engagement of the respondent in the subsequent proceedings.
14.2.2  Non-participation of the Respondent State
The effect of the Russian position, even if the national Declaration strictu senso 
provided no legitimate basis to avoid the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the present 
case, meant that ITLOS was confronted by an instance of non-appearance for the 
first time in its tenure. Non-appearance before international courts and tribunals is 
an infrequent, although regrettable, eventuality and one that has been within the 
contemplation of the constituent statutes of various judicial bodies. Annex VI of 
the LOSC, through which the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea is articulated, is no different in this regard and, by virtue of Article 28 of 
Annex VI, prescribes a basis for proceeding in a case of default:
When one of the parties does not appear before the Tribunal or fails to defend its case, the 
other party may request the Tribunal to continue the proceedings and make its decision. 
Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the 
proceedings. Before making its decision, the Tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it 
has jurisdiction over the dispute, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.
27
 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Arbitral Tribunal, 
Award on Jurisdiction, 26 November 2014, paras 70–78, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.
asp?pag_id=1556. Accessed 9 January 2015.
28
 The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum and Judge Kelly, para 9.
29
 The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus, para 5.
30
 Judge Golitsyn considered the application for provisional measures to be ‘inadmissible’ but 
did not address the nuances of the Russian Declaration, basing this view instead on the convoluted 
timeline of the incident and concluding that the prior obligation to exchange views pursuant to 
Article 283 of the LOSC had not been met. The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Golitsyn, paras 1–14. In this respect, he disagreed with the general finding of the Tribunal that the 
Netherlands had been able to consider attempts to reach an alternative resolution with the Russian 
authorities to have been exhausted. The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case, paras 72–78. Judge Kulyk, the only 
other dissenting voice, objected to the Order ultimately granted by the Tribunal but not, seemingly, its 
jurisdictional entitlement to make it. The ‘Arctic Sunrise’ Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kulyk.
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Notwithstanding this clear position—and, moreover, the explicit references within 
the Dutch submission to this provision—consideration of Article 28 of Annex VI 
within the Order of the Tribunal is distinctly conspicuous by its absence. Instead, 
the Tribunal based the decision to continue its deliberations upon a review of the 
relevant provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) 
and the jurisprudence of that Court. In this respect, Article 53 ICJ Statute provides 
that the appearing party may request a ruling in favour of its claim, subject to the 
proviso that the ICJ has jurisdiction over the dispute and that the action is well 
founded in fact and law. Article 28 of Annex VI was modelled upon this provision, 
albeit with the distinction that a state may only request a continuation of the pro-
ceedings before ITLOS, rather than an explicit ruling in its favour. In reality, there 
is little practical distinction since Article 53(2) ICJ Statute clarifies that a claim 
must still be adjudged to be well founded: it does not prescribe a walkover mecha-
nism for undefended, yet spurious, actions. The regime of non-appearance before 
the ICJ is buttressed by an obligation that the defaulting party be given an opportu-
nity to present its observations.31 Finding that Russia had been accorded ample 
occasion to do so, the Tribunal considered that the Netherlands should not be dis-
advantaged by its subsequent non-appearance32 and the status of the respondent as 
a party to the proceedings accordingly remained unchanged.33
While the practical distinction between the respective Statutes may be consid-
ered essentially minimal, the failure to undertake a reasoned evaluation of the 
scope of Article 28 of Annex VI nonetheless sat uneasily with individual members 
of the Tribunal. Judges Wolfrum and Kelly attributed this oversight to a purported 
inconsistency with Article 290 LOSC: Article 28 of Annex VI refers to the ‘juris-
diction’ of the Tribunal, yet the process for the grant of provisional measures 
envisaged under the 1982 Convention requires only that a judicial body be con-
vinced that it has prima facie jurisdiction.34 This begged the question as to 
whether an application for provisional measures was caught by the scope of 
Article 28 of Annex VI. This was considered to be unproblematic in the view of 
the judges, a position also taken by Judge Paik,35 since the ITLOS Statute drew no 
distinction between the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in assessing provisional 
31
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France), ICJ, Interim Protection, Order of 22 June 1973, para 11; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand 
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Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), ICJ, Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, para 13; 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), ICJ, 
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measures as opposed to any other context. In their view, there was no ostensible 
reason as to why the default clause could not be applied to the present dispute and 
the Tribunal had duly missed an opportunity to expand both its own jurisprudence 
and that of international decision-making bodies generally.36
Strong criticism was nonetheless reserved for the Russian refusal to participate 
in the process, an approach that the Tribunal considered ‘may hinder the regular 
conduct of the proceedings and affect the good administration of justice’.37 
Individual judges further noted their concerns that non-participation hampered the 
evidential base upon which to undertake their consideration of the issues,38 and 
served to undermine both the position of the Respondent and the wider system of 
compulsory settlement established under the LOSC.39 Unilateralism of this nature 
was clearly viewed in a dim light by ITLOS—especially since the Respondent had 
officially expressed clear faith in its legal position, which could have been swiftly 
tested before the Tribunal—and it has been suggested that a discernible punitive 
intent duly permeates the resulting Order.40 Indeed, as noted below, a strikingly 
different stance was taken by the Tribunal in an action addressing a number of 
similar issues convened shortly before that in relation to the Arctic Sunrise, in 
which the respondent opted to rebut a distinctly flimsy claim brought against it, 
where non-appearance might otherwise have been a tempting option.41
14.2.3  Prompt Release and Provisional Measures
Given that Russia’s refusal to participate provided no practical impediment to the 
continued judicial appraisal of the dispute, ITLOS ultimately ruled in favour of 
the Dutch application on 22 November 2013, ordering the immediate release of 
the Arctic Sunrise and its crew and the facilitation of their ability to leave Russian 
jurisdiction, contingent upon the payment of a bond of €3.6 million. As with other 
elements of the Order, however, the reasoning behind this decision is decidedly 
frugal and would have benefitted considerably from additional reflection—and, to 
a significant extent, a robust contribution in rebuttal on the part of the respondent.
36
 Ibid., at para 7.
37
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As noted above, ITLOS is empowered under Article 290(5) LOSC to order pro-
visional measures if it considers that the Annex VII body would have jurisdiction 
over the dispute and ‘the urgency of the situation so requires’. The Tribunal ruled 
in the affirmative on both points; the first of which has been subsequently con-
firmed by the Annex VII tribunal itself.42 The notion of ‘urgency’ being a relative 
concept, ITLOS observed that this provision must be read in conjunction with 
Article 290(1) LOSC, which emphasises the respective rights of the parties to the 
dispute and the need to prevent serious harm to the marine environment.43 The lat-
ter issue appeared to be of most direct interest to the Tribunal, with the 
Netherlands having raised concerns that the vessel itself, a veteran icebreaker, 
required extensive maintenance to prevent its general condition from deteriorating 
which could, given that it lay impounded in Murmansk, potentially threaten Arctic 
waters with pollution. No further analysis of this position was forthcoming within 
the Order, however, and ITLOS appears to have accepted the Dutch submission 
verbatim, prompting the rather minimalist conclusion that ‘the urgency of the case 
requires the prescription by the Tribunal of provisional measures’.44
In this respect, perhaps more than any other, the respondent was essentially the 
author of its own misfortune. By failing to provide any countervailing evidence 
that the Arctic Sunrise did not ultimately pose an environmental hazard, or that the 
national authorities were sufficiently equipped to address potential concerns, a 
considerable hurdle to the granting of provisional measures was duly removed by 
Russia itself. In marked contrast to this position, in rejecting a request for provi-
sional measures in the M/V Louisa dispute, ITLOS was prepared to ‘place on 
record the assurance given by Spain’ that there was no threat of imminent harm 
and that the national authorities were able to respond appropriately should the 
 vessel’s condition deteriorate.45 Interestingly, in that instance, the expert witness 
for the Applicant in raising such concerns had been accorded no opportunity to 
view the vessel in question, a position that further undermined the case for provi-
sional measures. Conversely, in the Arctic Sunrise case, little first-hand evidence 
was adduced as to the supposedly troubling state of the vessel, yet this position 
was accepted uncritically by the Tribunal.
There may indeed be pressing reasons as to why an arresting state ought to be 
ordered as a provisional measure to surrender an impounded vessel due to environ-
mental concerns—for instance, if it evidently lacks the resources or expertise to 
maintain it in safe condition or, hypothetically, if the authorities unreasonably insist 
upon securing a vessel with limited capacity to endure Arctic conditions in a noted 
42
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cold-water port such as Murmansk. There was, however, no reasoned basis as to why 
the Russian authorities could be considered to have lacked the ability to effectively 
manage the Arctic Sunrise under these circumstances; the Tribunal merely observed 
that the vessel was within the possession of the national coastguard and a chain of 
command had been established thereto.46 In refusing to participate in the proceed-
ings, however, Russia forfeited the opportunity to subject such arguments to further 
scrutiny and it appears that the Tribunal had little inclination to do so on its behalf.47
Historical instances of non-participation before the ICJ appear to have accorded 
the defaulting state no operational advantage in the proceedings.48 In this context, 
however, the Order appears to have reinforced a clear message that non-appear-
ance can have a critical bearing on the narrative of provisional measures before 
ITLOS. This general message was endorsed by the Tribunal, although the two dis-
senting Judges each raised concerns on this point, with Judge Kulyk warning that 
a failure to consider the Russian documentation as sufficient confirmation of an 
assumption of environmental obligations might potentially undermine the princi-
ple of good faith on the part of ITLOS.49 This is perhaps somewhat overplayed—
the notion of ‘security’ was not expounded further in the Russian documentation 
pertaining to the arrest, and could have been so addressed had Russia engaged 
with the process. The prevailing jurisprudence of the Tribunal is nonetheless sug-
gestive that, absent clear and contrary evidence, an unequivocal assertion of envi-
ronmental stewardship over an impounded vessel by the arresting state is generally 
sufficient, since in the incontrovertible logic of Judge Paik in the M/V Louisa 
 dispute, ‘if and when pollution occurs, it is the Respondent that will suffer the 
most’.50 While there was no intimation that the Russian authorities exhibited a 
negligent intent towards the vessel at the material time, it appears from the Order 
46
 Ibid., para 88.
47
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that silence is nonetheless insufficient: effective environmental stewardship must 
be formally asserted in the context of provisional measures, and will seemingly 
not be otherwise presumed by the Tribunal.
Likewise, the question of the respective rights of the parties also had considerable 
resonance for the Tribunal, although its reasoning on this point was again skeletal, 
while the Respondent’s failure to engage with the proceedings further undermined 
its position. In ordering the release of the vessel and crew,51 the Arctic Sunrise case 
marked a new departure in the prompt release practice of the Tribunal. The LOSC 
prescribes a mechanism for the prompt release of a vessel in two clear instances, 
namely fisheries infractions under Article 73 LOSC and the violation of particular 
rules and procedures pertaining to the prevention, reduction and control of vessel-
source pollution pursuant to Articles 220 and 226 LOSC. The circumstances of the 
Arctic Sunrise dispute accordingly lay outside these two fundamental premises, 
although there is no explicit position within the Convention that a similar process 
cannot in principle be applied in other contexts for the purposes of provisional 
measures. Nevertheless, the common denominator between the offences subject to 
the prompt release procedure under the LOSC is that they are to be addressed solely 
by financial penalties, as opposed to imprisonment or other sanctions.52 Under these 
circumstances, if prompt release is ordered and the crew and/or vessel subsequently 
flee the jurisdiction, the coastal state is left in materially the same position had the 
legal process run its full and legitimate course. In contrast, for alternative offences 
that may include the possibility of incarceration, the provision of financial security 
may arguably fail to fully secure the rights of the arresting state in such an instance.
For this reason, Judge Jesus considered that the Order of the Tribunal potentially 
represents ‘a back-door prompt release remedy’ for which the precedential value of 
the decision ought to have merited clearer explanation.53 Meanwhile, Judge 
Golitsyn considered that the decision fundamentally failed to protect the rights of 
the coastal state,54 a position that would appear to have some foundation. Indeed, 
while Article 290 allows the Tribunal to award appropriate provisional measures, it 
would have arguably been on safer ground in expanding the principles of prompt 
release to instances of nautical offences that solely carry financial penalties.55 The 
effect of the Order was therefore to truncate the criminal investigation into the 
51
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boarding of the Prirazlomnaya, which as noted below presented a genuine case to 
answer, thereby impinging upon the rights of the arrested state. Again, however, the 
future interpretation of this point may be based on the degree to which the Arctic 
Sunrise is viewed as a special case on default. To this end, it may be questioned 
whether a future panel would be as generously minded where the arresting state 
enters a robust defence of its entitlement to exercise the due process of its marine 
criminal jurisdiction.
On 18 December 2013, a general amnesty bill adopted by the Russian Duma to 
celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Russian Constitution was amended to 
include the arrested Prirzlomnaya activists. The Arctic Sunrise itself was finally 
and somewhat unexpectedly released from detention by the Russian authorities on 
6 June 2014.56 In March 2014, petitions by the Prirazlomnaya activists were sub-
mitted to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging violations of Articles 5 
and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.57 This development, as 
well as the ongoing examination of the dispute by the Annex VII Tribunal, raises 
the question as to the general position of protest activism at sea, to which this arti-
cle now turns.
14.3  Platforms and Protest Activism
14.3.1  Offshore Installations and the Law of the Sea
Specific powers over offshore installations are conferred on the coastal state through 
Article 60 of the LOSC.58 Under Article 60(2) LOSC, the coastal state has exclusive 
jurisdiction over installations and therefore controls access to these structures, as 
well as imposing criminal sanctions for breaching these rules. Reasonable safety 
zones may also be established around installations to ensure the safety of navigation 
and of the structures themselves.59 Under Article 60(5) LOSC, the coastal state may 
determine the dimensions of the safety zone up to a maximum of 500 m as meas-
ured from each point of their outer edge, except as authorised by ‘generally 
accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent international 
organization’, which is generally considered to be the International Maritime 
56
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Organization (IMO). Notwithstanding a degree of agitation by coastal states, the 
IMO has resisted a general expansion of the 500 m limit for safety zones.60 
Nevertheless, state practice remains somewhat variable and a degree of creeping 
jurisdiction has been experienced in this regard, exemplified in the context of the 
Prirazlomnaya, whose safety zone exceeds the current standards by some 2500 m.
Where such a zone is lawfully designated, ‘[a]ll ships must respect these safety 
zones and shall comply with generally accepted international standards regarding 
navigation in the vicinity’.61 In practice, breaching a safety zone will constitute a 
domestic criminal violation within most jurisdictions with an offshore industrial 
presence.62 The LOSC accordingly establishes no general foundation for vessels 
to enter these areas, nor for unauthorised access to the rigs themselves. 
Nevertheless, if the ‘vicinity’ of an offshore platform is understood as encapsulat-
ing the remaining areas of the EEZ that are not pockmarked by installations and 
their accompanying safety zones, it would be a logical assumption that activists 
may assert a right to demonstrate in these waters, to the extent that such a right is 
forthcoming under general privileges accorded to foreign shipping within the EEZ 
as outlined below. This point was not explicitly addressed by ITLOS in the Arctic 
Sunrise dispute, although it was clearly within the contemplation of individual 
judges that the activists ‘could invoke, among others, the freedom of expression as 
set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights whereas in the 
safety zone, depending on the factual situation, the exercise of such rights may 
have to yield to the safety interests of the operator of the platform’.63 The general 
position that safety zones are in principle not to be freely entered remains intact, 
however, and was considered a fundamental basis by Judge Golitsyn as to why 
provisional measures may not have served the interests of the coastal state in the 
Arctic Sunrise case.64
Ultimately, however, offshore installations are likely to remain an attractive target 
for determined campaigners, which will generally provoke a defensive response 
from the coastal state in question. Under Article 58(2) LOSC, the exclusivity of flag 
state jurisdiction is broadly extended to issues arising within the EEZ; the breach of 
this was indeed an issue of particular consternation to the Dutch authorities in the 
Arctic Sunrise action. Indeed, the IMO has considered that reporting an infraction to 
the flag state is, in the first instance, the most appropriate course of action where a 
60
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safety zone has been violated.65 Nevertheless, this appears to be subject to two 
broad exceptions operating in favour of the coastal state, although neither is without 
practical and legal difficulties. In the first instance, Article 111(2) LOSC establishes 
a right to hot pursuit in respect inter alia of violations of safety zones. This would 
seemingly extend to incursions by small boats launched from other ships which, 
under the doctrine of constructive presence, would justify the eventual arrest of the 
parent vessel if the conditions inherent in the exercise of hot pursuit have been law-
fully followed.66 The precise conditions regulating pursuit from inside a specific 
safety zone are not explicitly stated under the LOSC. However, Article 111(2) 
LOSC has been applied mutatis mutandis from the core principles established in 
Article 111(1) LOSC concerning pursuit from internal or archipelagic waters, the 
territorial sea or contiguous zone, specifying that pursuit must commence from 
within the zone in question. The implication is that hot pursuit in response to a vio-
lation of Article 60 must accordingly commence from within this zone to fulfil such 
criteria. As the Arctic Sunrise dispute amply illustrates, this may be a significant evi-
dential burden for the arresting state to discharge. The non-participation of Russia 
deprived the Tribunal of vital evidence to assess the legitimacy of such an approach. 
In contrast, the testimony submitted by the Netherlands suggests strongly that, while 
the general position on hot pursuit from such zones may hold true, the precise con-
ditions for its application were not made out in the present case.67
The second alternative is to invoke the law of piracy, as was controversially 
raised at the outset of the dispute, which would also override flag state jurisdic-
tion. This option, especially when applied to environmental campaigners, gener-
ates particular legal and diplomatic obstacles for the arresting state, as was amply 
illustrated in the aftermath of the arrest of the ‘Article 30’ on this basis. Piracy is 
defined under Article 101 of the LOSC as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for pri-
vate ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on 
board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State;
65
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(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in paras (a) or (b).
In this respect—and assuming that the unauthorised boarding of an oil platform 
qualifies as ‘violence’, ‘detention or ‘depredation’, a connection that is by no 
means axiomatic—two particular impediments would appear to militate against 
a finding of piracy. First, the requirement of ‘private ends’ would need to be 
established, an issue that has proved to be notoriously controversial when 
applied against those with political or altruistic motivations. Commentators 
have expressed concerns that environmental activists ought not in principle to 
be considered piratical in motivation,68 although a more inclusionary approach 
to the concept of private ends69 has been favoured by national courts on the rare 
occasions in which protest cases have proceeded on a foundation of piracy. 
Indeed, the lack of state sanction for the actions of protestors was considered a 
determinative factor in the deliberations of both the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation70 and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.71 If current 
jurisprudence suggests that this might be less problematic for the arresting 
authorities than has traditionally been considered the case, it is still by no 
means certain that every jurisdiction would adopt this approach. Second, and 
perhaps rather more significantly, piracy must be directed against a ‘ship or air-
craft’. It is highly doubtful whether an installation that has been affixed to the 
seabed to the extent that the designation of a safety zone is necessary would 
ordinarily qualify as a ‘ship’. No international court has as yet ruled upon the 
legal nature of an oil platform.72 However, most domestic jurisdictions exclude 
68
 See, for instance, Klein 2011, at 141.
69
 Such as that advanced by Guilfoyle, who argues that ‘the words “for private ends” must be 
understood broadly. All acts of violence that lack state sanction are acts undertaken “for private 
ends”.’ Guilfoyle 2009, at 36–37.
70
 Castle John and Nederlandse Stichting Sirius v. NV Mabeco and NV Parfin, Belgium, Cour de 
Cassation, 19 December 1986, reproduced in 77 International Legal Materials 537. The Cour de 
Cassation considered that, in boarding a vessel allegedly laden with toxic waste on the high seas, 
Greenpeace had acted violently and ‘in particular the pursuit by the applicant of the objects set 
out in its articles of association.’ Ibid., at 540.
71
 Institute of Cetacean Research and Others v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Watson, 
9th Cir., 725 F.3d 940, 2013. In this instance, private ends included ‘those pursued on personal, 
moral or philosophical grounds, such as Sea Shepherd’s professed environmental goals. That the 
perpetrators believe themselves to be serving the public good does not render their ends public’. 
Ibid., at 944. This decision overturned a previous judgment that considered that piracy was not 
made out in this instance, albeit one based on flawed reasoning.
72
 This issue was fleetingly raised in an application for provisional measures before the ICJ, but 
the matter was ultimately settled by agreement. Case Concerning Passage through the Great Belt 
(Finland v. Denmark), ICJ, Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July 1991.
378 R. Caddell
permanent seabed fixtures from the concept of a ‘ship’,73 while the IMO 
expressly considers that drilling apparatus and other platforms are vessels only 
while in transit.74 This provides some scope for piracy offences to be applied 
against oil platforms in certain circumstances—but not, it would clearly appear, 
in the particular context of the Prirazlomnaya.
A more specific basis for a coastal state to address incursions onto oil platforms 
would seem to be forthcoming from the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988.75 While the scope 
of this Convention is explicitly restricted to vessels ‘of any type whatsoever not 
permanently attached to the sea-bed’,76 a widely-ratified Protocol to the 
Convention does, however, apply to fixed platforms77 and creates a series of 
offence against such structures. Of most immediate relevance to at-sea protests is 
Article 2(1)(a) of the Protocol, which creates the offence of unlawfully and inten-
tionally seizing or exercising control over a fixed platform ‘by force or threat 
thereof or any other form of intimidation’. The nuances of this provision have not 
been tested by national or international courts and it nonetheless remains question-
able whether the actions of Greenpeace would have met the requisite standards of 
force or intimidation had the Prirazlomnaya protest proceeded as planned.
14.3.2  Freedom of Speech at Sea
A final element of the case—and one that raises wider questions concerning the 
contemporary use of ocean space—involved the role of human rights considera-
tions in framing the rationale for the protest itself and ensuring that the dispute 
between states did ‘not infringe upon [sic] the enjoyment of individual rights and 
freedoms of the crew of the vessels concerned.’78 At both the provisional measures 
stage and within the main proceedings of the Annex VII Tribunal, Greenpeace 
73
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sought to join the litigation as an amicus curiae, purporting to draw the attention 
of both panels to the human rights considerations incumbent in the case. 
Ostensibly, the human rights dimension is barely addressed within the Order for 
provisional measures, although it has been suggested in some quarters that these 
considerations exercised a latent influence over the decision-making process.79 As 
noted above, Judges Wolfrum and Kelly alluded to the possibility of the protestors 
invoking the ICCPR in support of certain elements of their activities, albeit with 
minimal discussion of the potential application of such norms in the present case. 
The clear rejection of both amicus curiae briefs suggests that such issues may 
remain secondary in importance to the more central—and, perhaps, less emotive—
concerns raised by the Netherlands as to the freedom of navigation. A degree of 
attention may nonetheless be forthcoming from the European Court of Human 
Rights on this point in due course, however, which has expanded its activist ten-
dencies towards the marine sphere in recent judgments.
The LOSC provides no specific guidance on the role of freedom of speech and 
assembly at sea, beyond a general rule of interpretation and through the residual 
rights established in the context of freedom of navigation. In the case of the for-
mer, Article 293(1) LOSC permits a court or tribunal faced with an interpretive 
question to apply both the LOSC as well as ‘other rules of international law not 
incompatible with this Convention’. The Tribunal declined to articulate a clear 
statement as to the compatibility of pertinent human rights norms to the present 
dispute, although previous cases suggest that both ITLOS80 and arbitral bodies81 
are prepared to do so where appropriate. In the meantime, it may be suggested that 
recourse to the European Court of Human Rights provides a more desirable means 
of raising these specific points, both in avoiding jurisdictional complications for a 
resulting tribunal and in addressing a more appropriate audience in the process.
Beyond the application of Article 293 LOSC, it may be suggested that there is 
considerable toleration for protest activities at sea under the 1982 Convention, 
albeit one that is contingent upon a balancing act with the rights of navigation of 
others and the overarching imperative of public safety at sea. In the context of the 
79
 Guilfoyle and Miles 2014, at 284–287.
80
 Most notably, in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 
ITLOS, Judgment on the Merits, 1 July 1999, ITLOS considered the extraneous context of the 
international rules governing the use of force, stating that ‘[a]lthough the Convention does not 
contain express provisions on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international law, which 
is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must be 
avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reason-
able and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the 
sea, as they do in other areas of international law.’ Ibid., para 155.
81
 In Guyana and Suriname the arbitral panel endorsed the approach of ITLOS in the M/V Saiga 
(No. 2) Case as a ‘reasonable interpretation of Article 293’ and accordingly rejected the submis-
sions of Suriname that it had no jurisdiction to address alleged violations of the UN Charter and 
general international law. Guyana and Suriname, PCA Award, 17 September 2007, para 406, 
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Prirazlomnaya protest, within the EEZ (as is the case on the high seas82), the 
LOSC prescribes that a vessel may exercise freedom of navigation subject to an 
obligation to exercise ‘due regard’ to the rights and duties of the coastal state and 
compliance with rules and regulations that are not incompatible with the exercise 
of EEZ powers.83 Therefore, there exists a right to conduct protest activities under 
the general principle of free navigation, provided that these conditions are met. 
This position has been reinforced by the IMO which, in May 2010, adopted a 
Resolution formally affirming ‘the rights and obligations relating to legitimate and 
peaceful forms of demonstration, protest or confrontation’ while simultaneously 
upholding the importance of vessel safety and condemning ‘any actions that inten-
tionally imperil human life, the marine environment, or property during demon-
strations, protests or confrontations on the high seas’.84 Resolution MSC.303(87) 
also calls upon protest vessels to refrain from actions that would violate interna-
tional navigational standards and for governments to establish a clear jurisdictional 
basis to proceed against vessels that fail to heed this approach. Although the 
Resolution is ultimately vague as to the specific rights and obligations incumbent 
in maritime protest, it may be considered that it provides an additional political 
imperative for flag states to take disciplinary action against delinquent protest ves-
sels upon the high seas. Through this measure, the IMO mandates compliance 
with global navigational rules as a minimum standard for protests at sea. It further 
appears that this position is reinforced within the margin of appreciation accorded 
to states under human rights norms to establish the boundaries of acceptable 
activism.
The current corpus of case-law addressing specifically nautical protest before 
the European Court of Human Rights is distinctly limited, but suggests that the 
Greenpeace petitions, if accepted by the Court, may encounter some turbulence in 
their appraisal of freedom of expression at sea. The Court has reaffirmed that 
marine space is little different from the terrestrial context in how the authorities 
should consider the legitimacy of such activities. It is clear from its jurisprudence 
that purported restrictions on access to marine areas by campaigners must be pro-
portionate to the wider aim pursued by the state in question. In perhaps the leading 
case to date, Women On Waves and Others v. Portugal,85 a Dutch NGO that had 
intended to conduct a family planning campaign in Portuguese ports was banned 
from the entirety of the national territorial sea, primarily due to concerns that the 
vessels would be used to facilitate abortions, a practice that was still illegal in 
Portugal at the time. Although no evidence of law-breaking was adduced, warships 
82
 Article 87(1) LOSC.
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 Article 58(3) LOSC. This position is different within the territorial sea, whereby a foreign 
vessel must exhibit innocent passage, for which protest activities may be considerably more 
restricted in scope. Similarly internal waters are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the 
coastal state.
84
 Resolution MSC.303(87): Assuring Safety During Demonstrations, Protests or Confrontations 
on the High Seas.
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 Women On Waves and Others v. Portugal, ECtHR, No. 31276/05, 9 February 2009.
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were deployed to prevent the applicants from disembarking at any point within the 
territorial sea. The Court considered this response to be a violation of their Article 
10 ECHR rights, since the Portuguese authorities had other, less intrusive, means 
at their disposal to address the perceived problem posed by the activists including, 
if the allegations as to their intentions were correct, the possibility of seizing medi-
cation and equipment proscribed under national law.86
Moreover, the Court held that there was no legal basis under the Convention to 
ban foreign campaigners from a zone of maritime jurisdiction, since the territorial 
sea was considered fundamentally to be:
un espace public et ouvert de par sa nature meme, contrairement aux locaux d’une admin-
istration ou d’un ministère.87
While this decision would, at face value, suggest a broad toleration for nautical 
protest, it may be considered that the situation is rather more nuanced. Indeed, per-
haps more problematic from the standpoint of Greenpeace’s Article 10 arguments 
is a precedent that lies rather closer to home. In Drieman and Others v. Norway,88 
four Greenpeace activists were convicted of a series of public order offences, and 
a dinghy was impounded by the Norwegian courts, following a series of alterca-
tions between protestors and a whaling vessel in the Norwegian EEZ. The 
Norwegian Supreme Court reduced the fines that had been levied against the 
applicants by the municipal authorities, but upheld the confiscation order and 
rejected claims of a violation of Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. The European Court of 
Human Rights declined the application as manifestly ill-founded, with the meas-
ures adopted by Norway considered to have been supported by relevant and suffi-
cient reasons and underpinned by a rationale for public maritime safety that was 
necessary in a democratic society.89 Moreover, the Court reiterated that national 
policies to restrict obstructive protest ‘must be allowed a wide margin of apprecia-
tion’ and it was accordingly ‘not persuaded by the applicants’ argument that the 
proscribed conduct should be assimilated to an incident of navigation’.90
The combined effect of Women On Waves and Drieman suggests that, absent a 
reasonable basis to presume intended misconduct, a state cannot preclude access 
to its maritime jurisdiction to activists per se, although localised restrictions on 
movement may be imposed where necessary to safeguard public safety and the 
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legitimate rights of others. Nevertheless, this does not equate to an automatic right 
to maritime access in all cases. Freedom of speech may be upheld even where 
campaigners are refused entry to marine areas, although Drieman mandates that an 
effective alternative basis to espouse their views must be maintained. In the con-
text of the Prirazlomnaya dispute, the Russian authorities considered the boarding 
of the platform unjustified since Greenpeace had been granted an opportunity to 
contribute to appropriate Arctic governance fora concerning the broad regulation 
of oil and gas installations in the High North. The extent to which these opportu-
nities have provided a realistic platform to inform debate on the pursuit of Arctic 
hydrocarbons will be seemingly constitute a significant question in any future 
deliberations by the Court in assessing a potential breach of the Convention.
14.4  Concluding Remarks
The order for provisional measures by ITLOS in the Arctic Sunrise case marks the 
end of the beginning for a dispute that raises pressing questions concerning ele-
ments of free navigation, as well as the burgeoning international jurisprudence on 
the legal parameters of protest actions at sea. As with other such orders, which are 
debated and delivered in comparative haste and are not designed to address the 
specific merits of the dispute,91 the reasoning of the Tribunal in the present case is 
decidedly brief and not entirely consistent with elements of previous decisions. 
The order in many respects represents a missed opportunity on the part of ITLOS 
to expand its procedural jurisprudence, not least concerning the specific rules on 
default as elaborated under Part VI of the LOSC, while conversely the projected 
extension of aspects of the prompt release mechanism could be construed as 
excessive.
Individual elements of the order present some cause for unease, notably the 
uncritical acceptance of the Dutch submission as to the alleged environmental 
imperatives for provisional measures, while the decision itself strikes a generous 
balance in favour of the flag state in the context of an ongoing and legitimate (if 
somewhat politicised) criminal investigation by the coastal state. It remains to be 
seen whether elements of this approach will be followed by ITLOS in subsequent 
cases, or whether the Arctic Sunrise will be viewed in its unique context of default 
by the respondent state. The underlying message of the order is nevertheless that 
non-appearance before the Tribunal can significantly undermine the position of the 
defaulting state; it remains an exercise in conjecture as to whether provisional 
measures would have been as freely ordered in this case had the respondent 
mounted a meaningful defence of its legal interests. Meanwhile, the position of 
91
 Nevertheless, this issue did have some bearing on the order, with Judge Jesus considering that 
‘there are some matters of substance that a court or tribunal dealing with a request for provisional 
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Russia in the dispute remains a cause for wider concern: the national authorities 
have responded to the incident by ignoring international judicial institutions and 
adjusting domestic law to allow for a more robust security presence aboard off-
shore platforms such as the Prirazlomnaya.92
The Arctic Sunrise case also provides scope for further judicial appraisal of 
the human rights issues involved in protest actions at sea, an issue that has been 
developed piecemeal by national and regional courts to date. These elements 
were addressed peripherally within this order on an official basis, although as the 
Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Kelly demonstrates, they nonetheless 
played a role in the contemplation of individual judges. The arbitral panel may 
opt to follow the lead of ITLOS in this regard and focus specifically on the navi-
gation-related elements of the dispute, for which there are important questions to 
answer. Issues of free speech at sea might be more appropriately addressed by the 
European Court of Human Rights in this instance, although there is a case for sug-
gesting that such entitlements may be viewed more conservatively than a number 
of campaign groups have argued thus far; international maritime law considers that 
protest actions within clearly designated safety zones ought to be tempered by the 
demands of public security at sea. In the meantime the Arctic Sunrise, still bearing 
the Dutch flag, was arrested in November 2014 by the Spanish authorities, follow-
ing a series of clashes during a protest against oil exploration. Questions over the 
exercise of free speech rights at sea—and the involvement of the Netherlands in 
their resolution—accordingly look set to continue for some considerable time.
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